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In a short, brilliant essay, an economist challenges the classic view
that competition can or should always be relied upon to discipline firms
by excluding them from the market in favor of their lower-price,
better-quality rivals. The metaphor "exit" seems to cover desertion
of a firm by some of its customers as well as disappearance of a firm
from the market because of customer attrition. But Hirschman em-
phasizes the fact that big firms do not disappear, except from the model
universes of some economists, and that summary exit of firms would
not be desirable. Rather, the firm should receive its trouble warn-
ings-whether from the initial exit of the most sensitive customers or
from "voice"--in time to effect "recuperative" measures. The exit
model of a competitive economy grows more and more remote from
reality as the size and diversity of operations of the corporate giants
increase. Manifestly, great corporations neither die nor fade away.
They are "reorganized," sometimes with no substantial change of
management, under favorable bankruptcy law provisions. Or they are
rescued from fatal consequences appropriate to their entrepreneurial
mistakes by loans and other support from tax sources. Or they are
metamorphosized as divisions of vast acquiring corporations to whom
they have special value for their tax losses; i.e., survival has once more
been financed at the expense of the taxpayer.
"Voice" is organized consumer complaint, of which Ralph Nader
is the avatar. Its effectiveness may rest in part on the threat of exit,
but it functions even where exit is difficult or impossible, as in the case
of monopolies and oligopolies.1 Given the reserves of unexercised
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I See HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 124 (1970):
[O]rganizations and firms that are ostensibly competing and are normally
sensitive to exit can learn to play a cooperative, collusive game in the course
of which they take in each other's disgruntled customers or members. To
the extent that the game is played successfully by competing organizations
or firms, exit, compensated as it is by entry, ceases to be a serious threat
to the deteriorating organizations.
Letters collected by Ralph Nader and made available to Hirschman illustrate
the foregoing point:
(a) to the Ford Motor Company: "... You can be assured that I
absolutely will not purchase another Ford of any kind no matter what your
usual form letter to me will say . . ." ". . . Needless to say my Falcon
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power ("slack") in all firms, and notably in lethargic monopolies
(Hirschman ridicules the classic model of the "taut" economy, accord-
ing to which one false move, a moment's relaxation in the obsessive
effort to maximize profits, spells disaster for the firm), and given also
management's desire to escape the discomfort of clamorous criticism, a
determined minority of dissatisfied customers can influence policy.
But this potentiality will not be realized if exit is a readily available
alternative to solve the problems of those most likely to be sensitive to
decline in the quality of service and most ingenious and persistent in
using voice. Hirschman takes as an example the Nigerian national
railroad system. He observed that it was miserably inefficient, not-
withstanding the lively competition of road transport which should
theoretically have goaded it into decent performance. He explains this
paradox by pointing out that the threat of exit is no great stimulus to
an enterprise that can cover its losses out of the public treasury, and
that voice is dampened in such a situation by the ease with which the
most vigorous of the railroad's clientele can shift to the motor high-
ways. Hirschman might well have cited, in this connection, the trans-
port system of the United States, where potent sources of "voice" have
been muffled by the easy escape of farmers and big corporations from
the constraints of regulated transport through the private carriage and
agricultural exemptions of the Motor Carriers Act.2
A similar analysis leads Hirschman to reject proposals for a
"market" solution to the problems of public education, e.g., by arrange-
ments encouraging private schools (i.e., exit from the public school
system). The end of concern for the public school system by those
most likely to be able to bring about its recuperation would, on this
view, condemn the system to utter degradation. Hirschman also
argues that, where "public goods" are at issue, e.g., police, fire pro-
tection, schooling, exit is illusory; each person has a stake in others
enjoying the public good; in a sense, therefore, one remains a consumer
even after he exits. Accordingly, the encouragement of voice may call
for the design of economic and political institutions in which exit is
inhibited. It is in this connection that Hirschman identifies and ex-
amines the function of "loyalty" as a beneficent restraint on premature
exit.
is the last of any Ford product I would consider to purchase. I am a young
girl of 25, reasonably attractive, who has depleted her bank account buying
Falcon transmissions, when there are other things in this world where the
money could be put to much better use . . ."; and (b) to the General
Motors Corporation: ". . . At home we have a Chevrolet bus and a Chev-
rolet van. You may be sure that after all of this trouble and inconvenience
and wasted time I shall never own a General Motors product again . . ."
". .. I have had a G.M. auto and wagon for many years now but maybe
FORD has a better idea. I'll try to put up with this LEMON till the '70
models come out, but you can be sure there will be no G.M. product of any
kind on my driveway .
Id. 27-28 n.7.
249 U.S.C.A. §303(b)(6) (Supp. 1972); 49 U.S.C. §303(c) (1970). See
ScHwARTz, FREE ENTERPaISE AND EcoNomic ORGANIZATION 359-62 (4th ed. 1972).
1972]
1212 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Hirschman is as interested in applying the analysis to nonprofit
organizations, particularly political parties, as he is in exploring alterna-
tives to exit in the economic field. On the political side, he sees in-
sufficient reliance on exit corresponding to insufficient reliance on voice
in economics. He uses as a prime illustration the failure of leading
figures in the Johnson administration to resign over their disagreement
with the Vietnam policy. Voice was here cleverly suppressed by offer-
ing potentially powerful critics the illusion of influence through "work-
ing from within." It is, of course, a nice question when to accept the
harsh fact that voice, as an insider, has become ineffectual, and to go
over the barrier of loyalty to exit. Hirschman sees political and
business managers as regularly engaged in protecting their power
positions by diverting discontent from exit to ineffectual voice, as in
the Post Office's infamous statutory bar against the escape of its much-
abused customers to more efficient private carriers, 3 or from voice to
ineffectual exit, as in the cross-exit of aggrieved customers of GM to
Ford, and aggrieved customers of Ford to GM.4
What are the implications of Hirschman's insights for lawyers
and legislators concerned with the economy? He never relates his
thesis directly to the antitrust laws, and I have difficulty envisioning
any relaxation of the law on this front that he would think called for
by his proposal that we not rely exclusively on competition. The role
of voice is not to replace exit, but to supplement it, as regulation
supplements the antitrust laws in contexts where competition cannot be
the sole reliance to protect the public welfare.' Indeed, since regulation
too is a weak reed,6 voice will be at least as significant in the regulated
sectors of the economy as in the putatively competitive sectors.
Should we then seriously consider blocking the exits from regu-
lated service, by repealing or narrowing the exemptions for private
carriage, contract carriage, agricultural carriage, or cooperative self-
service, so as to generate voice, as implied in Hirschman's anecdote
about the Nigerian national railway? I think not. The optimal mix of
exit, regulation, and voice depends on the particular politico-economic
setting. Even assuming that Hirschman wanted the exits blocked in
Nigeria, the United States is not Nigeria. The American regulatory
mechanism, for all its defects, is presumably stronger than that of
Nigeria, and comes under the scrutiny of congressional committees and
prestigious academic critics. Moreover, exit, under American condi-
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 1694, 1696 (1970).
4 Monopolists have need of illusory competition for this purpose. See note 1
supra.
5 Cf. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) ; California
v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
6See generally KAHN, THE EcoxomIcs OF REGULATION (1970-1971), reviewed
in 120 U. PA. L. REv. 584 (1972).
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tions, powerfully reinforces voice: the legislative exemption secured by
influential political groups (agricultural interests; giant corporations
that can operate their own fleets of trucks) gives the lie to the myth
that regulation is essential to maintain good service and low, cost-
related prices. Our tolerance of exit also exposes the hypocrisy of the
contention that "national defense" or highway safety requires the
maintenance of a restrictionist system of transport regulation: why
should "farmers" and oligopolists escape or wish to escape making
their fair contribution to "national defense" and enjoying the vaunted
benefits of highway safety under monopoly regulation?
One can imagine situations where exit might usefully be barred.
It might, for example, be worthwhile restraining the switch from public
buses to private cars by excluding the latter from central city areas.
Here more is at stake than the putative gain from enhancing voice.
There is also the need to recognize that classic market mechanisms do
not charge the private motorist with all the social costs of his traffic-
choking presence.
It is also obviously the part of wisdom to refrain from encouraging
exit from the rails to the highways, e.g., by subsidizing highway or
barge transport or by holding rail rates high to pay returns on secu-
rities whose claims to cash flow should long ago have been eliminated
through bankruptcy. A cold disregard for sunk capital costs, in an
industry in which new investment is unlikely, might put rail rates at a
level that would stop the switch of freight to trucks. Perhaps we
should reexamine the trade-off between rail efforts to hold or gain
customers through "discriminatory" pricing and the anti-competitive
impact of such discrimination on other modes of transport or upon dis-
favored shippers. Loyalty must be encouraged, not a mythical virtuous
loyalty that ignores self-interest, and not a loyalty unstably built upon
advertising that deceptively manipulates consumer preferences, but a
loyalty resting on realistic hope of improvement through customer
organization and pressure. One wonders in this connection what the
experience has been with associations of shippers dealing with rail and
steamship carriers.
The general implication of Hirschman's essay for lawyers and
legislators is that we must continually broaden our categories of
remedial measures against the lethargy and abuses of concentrated
power. We must learn to discriminate situations where exit is and
will continue to be the best signal to industrial managers and party
big-wigs from other situations where voice is the best hope and the
immediate objective must be to strengthen it. Among the ways that
voice might be strengthened in our economy are the following: build up
the leverage of public interest groups in administrative proceedings,'
establish the power of the Federal Trade Commission to order affirma-
7 See Comment, Public Participation in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 120
U. PA. L. REv. 702 (1972). But cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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tive disclosures by advertisers, require advertising media to provide
space and time for "anti-advertising" by consumer groups, devise more
effective class actions in favor of consumers, subsidize independent con-
sumer research and education, and conduct "yardstick" operations
under government sponsorship in fields other than electrical power.8
8 This oblique reference to the Tennessee Valley Authority is to be understood
as relating to one of the concepts that animated it at the time of its creation in the
1930's; not to the mature conservatism of the present industry-oriented bureaucracy.
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